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Abstract The European Commission has recently launched a new project intended
to create a Capital Markets Union. One obstacle in the way of the Commission’s
vision is the current market infrastructure for holding securities. This infrastructure
is inefficient because it prevents investors from exercising voting rights and from
claiming against issuers. It also exposes investors to the risk of shortfalls, which
increases with the number of custodians that operate between issuers and investors.
This article also shows that the regulatory regime as it stands fails to remedy this
inefficiency or to contain the risk. It points to possible avenues for law reform but
concludes that these, too, are unlikely to improve the situation. The conclusion is
that investors should receive information about the identity of all sub-custodians
that operate between them and the issuer and about their terms.
Keywords Capital Markets Union  Custodian  Securities  Settlement  Client
assets  MiFID  Custody  Depositories  Central securities depositories  Target 2
securities
1 Introduction
The European Commission has recently launched a new project intended to create a
Capital Markets Union (Sect. 2). One obstacle in the way of the Commission’s
vision is the current market infrastructure for holding securities (Sect. 3). This
infrastructure is inefficient because it prevents investors from exercising voting
rights and from claiming against issuers (Sect. 4). It also exposes investors to the
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risk of shortfalls, which increases with the number of custodians that operate
between issuers and investors (Sect. 5). The analysis in Sects. 5 and 6 also shows
that the regulatory regime as it stands fails to remedy this inefficiency or to contain
the risk. It points to possible avenues for law reform but concludes that these, too,
are unlikely to improve the situation.
The European Central Bank has recently started an IT project entitled ‘Target 2
Securities’ (T2S) (Sect. 6). The hope is that the platform will provide custodians with a
framework within which they compete with each other. Competition then can lead to a
leaner and more efficient infrastructure. This paper argues that the T2S project only
creates a further layer of complexity. Moreover, a new computer programme does not
put in place an incentive for custodians to engage in competition.
The conclusion of the paper is that investors should receive disclosure about the
identity of all sub-custodians and their terms (Sects. 7 and 8).
2 The Vision
On 18 February 2015, the European Commission published the Green Paper on Building a
Capital Markets Union.1 The Commission observed that, compared to other parts of the
world, European businesses remain heavily reliant on banks for funding and relatively less
so on capital markets.2 After the financial crises, bank funding dried up and recent
regulatory reforms have made it more difficult for banks to take on debt.
The Commission would like to unlock more investment for all companies by
attracting investors from the rest of the world to the EU and by persuading the
citizens of Europe to take their money out of bank deposits and real estate and invest
it in European businesses and infrastructure projects.
To facilitate this, the Commission believes it needs to identify and remove
barriers which stand between investors’ money and investment opportunities. The
system for channelling funds—the investment chain—needs to be made as efficient
as possible, both nationally and across borders.
The Commission intends to build a single market for capital from the bottom up,
identifying barriers and knocking them down one by one, creating a sense of
momentum and helping to spark a growing sense of confidence in investing in
Europe’s future. The free flow of capital was one of the fundamental principles upon
which the EU was built. More than fifty years on from the Treaty of Rome, the
Commission would like to seize the opportunity to turn that vision into reality.3
1 European Commission, Green Paper: Building a Capital Markets Union, Brussels 18 Feb 2015
COM(2015)63 final (CMU Green Paper), available at http://ec.europa.eu/finance/consultations/2015/
capital-markets-union/index_en.htm (last accessed 9 Sept 2016).
2 CMU Green Paper, supra n. 1, at p. 2; see also Commission Staff Working Document, Economic
Analysis accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament,
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Action
Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union, Brussels 30 September 2015 (CMU Economic Analysis),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/finance/capital-markets-union/docs/building-cmu-economic-analysis_en.
pdf (last accessed 9 Sept 2016).
3 CMU Green Paper, supra n. 1, at p. 3.
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3 Securities Law as a Barrier
Having stated its vision, the Commission then identifies and analyses a number of
barriers that stand in the way of and invites contributions on how these could be
removed. One of the barriers mentioned is the market infrastructure and securities
law. The Commission points out that the ‘piping’ which channels investments and
the laws under which it is treated are key determinants of the efficiency and ease by
which investment can be made.4
The Staff Working Document supporting the Green Paper mentions that the US
securities markets are underpinned by only two central securities depositories
(CSDs). European securities are, by contrast, not held in one but in a range of CSDs
in different countries. Investors may need to rely on additional intermediaries to
access markets outside their own jurisdiction. They will have to go through
international CSDs and global and local custodians.







The characteristic feature of a custody chain that operates across borders is that
there is no direct connection between the issuer and the investor. The investor has a
relationship with a domestic retail custodian. That custodian has a relationship with
a domestic wholesale custodian, who has a relationship with a global custodian, who
has another relationship with a CSD. The CSD is connected with the issuer.
Custody chains create a barrier to investment. They introduce significant
operational risks and costs. Investors who hold securities are exposed to the risk of
the issuer defaulting. This risk applies notwithstanding how securities are held.
When securities are held through a chain of custodians, investors are saddled with
additional risk. A custody chain can make it impossible for investors to exercise
voting rights5 or to claim against the issuer (Sect. 4). Custody chains also expose the
investor to the risk that any of the custodians forming the chain do not have
sufficient securities to meet the investor’s claim (Sect. 5).
The issue is complex as it touches on property, contract, corporate and
insolvency law, as well as on the laws on holding of securities and conflict of laws.6
4 Ibid., at p. 23; CMU Staff Working Document, infra n. 5, at p. 15; see also Communication from the
Commission, Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union, COM(2015) 468 final, Brussels,
30.9.2015 (CMU Action Plan), at pp. 23–24, available at http://ec.europa.eu/finance/capital-markets-
union/docs/building-cmu-action-plan_en.pdf (last accessed 9 Sept 2016).
5 Commission Staff Working Document, Initial reflections on the obstacles to the development of deep
and integrated EU capital markets, accompanying the document Green Paper: Building a Capital Market
Union, Brussels 18 Feb 2015, COM(2015)63 final (CMU Staff Document), at p. 13, available at http://
eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52015SC0013 (last accessed 9 Sept 2016).
6 CMU Green Paper, supra n. 1, at p. 23.
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The Staff Working Document adds that the subject is also politically sensitive, with
discussions dating back more than a decade.7
There are two views on how to proceed. According to one view, there is potential
to make further improvements to the market infrastructure through European
legislation. Legislation relating to investors’ rights in securities differs amongst
Member States.
According to a different view, no legislation is required because the Target 2
Securities project, which was launched on 22 June 2015, will remove the legal and
operational risks associated with the transfer and holding of securities across
jurisdictions and reduce costs, and it could increase cross-border investments.
This article first illustrates inefficiencies that trouble a market infrastructure that
is built on custody chains (Sects. 4, 5). It concludes that neither of the
abovementioned options is likely to create an efficient market infrastructure.
Against the background of an infrastructure that connects custodians through
bilateral contracts, there is not much the law can do. Moreover, custodians have no
incentive to compete with each other. Target 2 Securities and the Central Securities
Depositories Regulation are unlikely to change that (Sect. 6). Investors should be
given disclosure about sub-custodians and their terms, enabling them to kick-start a
process that leads to a more efficient system (Sects. 7, 8).
4 Exercising and Enforcing Rights Against Issuers
4.1 Voting Rights
The European Commission points out that custody chains can make it difficult for
investors to exercise voting rights.8 This is supported by empirical evidence
showing that logistics involved in processing voting instructions in custody chains
prevent votes from reaching issuers.9 Notwithstanding the available technology,
passing along voting rights through a chain has proven to be very difficult.10
Custodians normally outsource the processing of voting instructions to proxy
advisors.11 These providers need to process these instructions and set deadlines that
are 7–10 days before the meeting.12 If an investor sells shares after that deadline but
before the deadline for sending votes to the issuer, it is possible that the seller’s
7 CMU Staff Working Document, supra n. 5, at p. 15.
8 Ibid., at p. 13.
9 Company Law Review Final Report I, para. 6.25. See also Review of the Impediments to Voting UK
Shares, Report by Paul Myners to the Shareholder Voting Working Group, July 2007, at pp. 1–4, and
Report of the Committee of Inquiry into UK Vote Execution, on behalf of the National Association of
Pension Funds, July 1999, para. 1.7; see also Zetzsche (2008), at p. 327, and Strenger and Zetzsche
(2013), at pp. 517–522.
10 See also Zetzsche (2008), at p. 333, and Kahan and Rock (2007).
11 Manifest (2007), at p. 3.
12 Custodians sometimes also block shares in order to be able to process voting instructions, European
Commission, Directorate General Internal Market and Services, Summary of the Informal Discussion
Concerning the Initiative on Shareholders Engagement (March 2013), at p. 6.
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instructions cannot be cancelled in time and that the buyer’s instructions have
nevertheless reached the issuer. In these circumstances the company will receive
more votes than shares. The company does not have access to the records of the
proxy advisors or of the custodians forming the chain. It is therefore unable to
determine which votes to accept. If there is doubt as to whether a vote was validly
cast, the company will disregard that vote.13 Problems are exacerbated by omnibus
accounts. The service providers concerned need to determine what proportion has
abstained or has voted for or against on every resolution. If the shares are held
through more than one custodian, this process has to be repeated at every level. If
shares are sold during that period, voting instructions need to be withdrawn and re-
issued. There is a view that in these circumstances accurate reconciliation of
holdings is next to impossible.14 If an issuer receives more voting instructions for an
omnibus account than shares held in the name on the register, there is a risk that all
votes cast in relation to that registered name will be disregarded. If the name
registered on the shareholder register relates to an omnibus account, this can,
apparently, lead to the registrar having to disregard the votes for as much as 10% of
the shares on the register.15
4.2 Enforcement of Rights
It has been shown elsewhere that custody chains can make the enforcement of rights
next to impossible.16 There are two recent UK High Court cases where investors
were prevented by a custody chain that operated between them and the issuer from
enforcing rights. One case concerned German investors who failed to claim as
shareholders of a UK-registered company whose shares were listed in Germany.17
The other case concerned an investor in bonds that were issued under English law
and held through a custody chain involving Luxembourg.18 In both cases the reason
for being unable to enforce rights was that the custody chain prevented the investor
from having standing in a lawsuit against the issuer.
4.3 Limitations of the Law
There are two ways for the law to help here. One is to require custodians to pass on
rights along the chain. The other option is to empower indirect investors, giving
them a right to pierce through their custody chain irrespective of whether this is
supported by the documentation that governs their immediate custody relationship
or the relationships between the sub-custodians.
13 Manifest (2007), at p. 3.
14 Ibid., at p. 4; M van Esch (Robeco), ‘Audit shows flaws in the proxy-voting process’, 29 October 2012,
available at http://www.robeco.com/en/professionals/insights/sustainability-investing/insights/2012/
audit-shows-flaws-in-the-proxy.jsp (last accessed 12 Jan 2016).
15 Manifest (2007), at p. 4; see also van Esch (Robeco), supra n. 14.
16 Micheler (2015).
17 Eckerle v Wickeder [2013] EWHC 68 (Ch) [2014] Ch 196.
18 Secure Capital SA v Credit Suisse AG [2015] EWHC 388 (Comm) 25 Feb 2015.
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4.3.1 Requiring Custodians to Pass on Rights
The law could impose a duty on custodians to pass on rights and information along
the chain between issuers and investors. This approach underlies the recent
Commission proposal for a new Shareholder Rights Directive (SRD II Proposal).19
The proposal aims to make it easier for shareholders to exercise voting rights.20 The
rules proposed apply to equity securities only. Art. 3a requires Member States to
ensure that intermediaries offer listed companies the possibility to have their
shareholders identified. Upon a request of a listed company the intermediary shall
communicate without delay to the company the name and contact details of
shareholders. If there is more than one intermediary in a holding chain, the request
of the company and the shareholder details shall be transmitted between
intermediaries without undue delay.21 Member States may stipulate that CSDs are
to be responsible for collecting the information and for providing it directly to the
company.22 Member States also need to ensure that any intermediary that transmits
this information will not, as a result of this, be in breach of contract or law.
If a listed company chooses not to directly communicate with shareholders,
Member States need to ensure that information that is necessary for a shareholder to
exercise rights flowing from his shares shall be transmitted by the intermediaries
without undue delay.23 Member States shall also ensure that the intermediary
facilitates the exercise of rights by shareholders, including the right to participate
and vote in general meetings.24 The Commission has powers to adopt implementing
acts to specify the requirements that need to be met by Member States.
The proposed Directive instructs custodians to pass on information. The
information is communicated bilaterally from one custodian to the other. This
does not improve the situation much. It is true that, at present, custodians can use
terms that do not require them to facilitate the exercise of rights by investors. If the
Commission succeeds in drafting appropriate implementing measures, using such
terms should no longer be possible for custodians that are based within the reach of
19 Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 2007/36/EC as regards the encouragement of long-term
shareholder engagement and Directive 2013/34/EC as regards certain elements of the corporate
governance statement, COM(2014) 213, 2014/0121/COD, http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/detail_dossier_real.
cfm?CL=en&DosId=1041890 (accessed 9 Sept 2016) (SRD II Proposal); on 19 December 2014, the
Committee on Legal Affairs published a draft report on the Commission’s proposal suggesting
amendments, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=COMPARL&mode=XML&language
=EN&reference=PE544.471, accessed 9 Sept 2016 (SDR II Proposal Draft Report European Parliament).
20 SRD II Proposal, supra n. 19, at p. 5.
21 Ibid., Art. 3a(2).
22 SDR II Proposal Draft Report European Parliament, supra n. 19, Art. 3a(2), as amended.
23 Requiring custodians to assist with voting is a suggestion that can also be found in the literature:
Zetzsche (2008), at p. 334, proposes to impose a duty on custodians to assist investors to vote and to
prohibit custodians from charging fees for this. He also suggests that custodians should be encouraged to
negotiate common technical standards and that the ‘principle of proportionality’ should be extended to
custodians, but does not further explain what the principle of proportionality would imply in the
circumstances. Note that a duty to exercise voting instructions already exists in English law: Kirby v
Wilinks [1929] 2 Ch 444.
24 SRD II Proposal, supra n. 19, Art. 3c.
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European rules. But that does not achieve much. The rules will merely instruct
custodians to take part in a game of Chinese whispers where at each level there is
potential for mistakes to occur.
Moreover, requiring custodians to facilitate the enforcement of claims against
issuers is unlikely to create an efficient framework. It is impossible to manage
litigation using communication that is channelled through a custody chain. The
lawyers representing the investor would have to route every—even the most
minor—procedural instruction through the custody chain to cause it to be executed
by the custodian connected to the issuer.
A more effective option would be to introduce a requirement enabling the
investor to collapse the chain. The investor would have a right to request delivery or
assignment of the rights held by his custodian. Having stepped into the shoes of that
custodian, he would then be entitled to request delivery/assignment of the rights
held by the next custodian and continue along the chain until he is in the position of
a direct investor.
Assuming law could be drafted to deliver this result in all European jurisdictions,
the process would still be long-winded and time-consuming, significantly adding
cost to the enforcement of claims against issuers.
4.3.2 Empowering Indirect Investors
Another option enabling investors to enforce rights against issuers would be to require
issuers to recognise indirect investors. This is easier said than done. Issuers would have
to be able to verify the identity of an indirect investor.25 They would not know who the
custodians are that act between them and the investor. The identity and number of
custodians also changes as securities are bought and sold. Even if no transactions
occurred, custodians would be able to move securities between sub-custodians, and sub-
custodians would be able to delegate holdings to further sub-custodians. Issuers would
have to request and investors would have to deliver verification starting from the CSD
(or its sub-custodian) and then each custodian operating between them and the investor
one after the other. This would be burdensome, time-consuming and costly.
4.4 Conclusions
The law is not able to do much. As long as the market infrastructure is organised
through custody chains, significant friction will continue to occur, making it difficult
if not impossible to exercise and enforce rights. Against the background of the
current infrastructure, all that can be done is to set in motion a series of bilateral
communications from one custodian to the next. That is cumbersome, time-
consuming, costly and prone to mistakes. Investors are unable to claim against or
chase anyone but their own custodian. Custodians have reputational incentives.
However, since sub-custodians have no relationship with investors and their identity
is not known to the investor, their reputation is exposed only to a very limited
extent. This makes investments that are associated with custody chains unattractive.
25 Nolan (2003), at p. 81.
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5 Shortfalls and Regulation
5.1 Introduction
Another problem rendering a market infrastructure built on custody chains inefficient
and creating a barrier obstructing cross-border investment is that investors only have
full entitlements if all custodians have sufficient balances to meet the claims of all
investors concerned. If there is a shortfall at the level of any of the custodians, the rights
of the investor are reduced. In a custody chain, the risk of shortfalls is significant. The
more custodians, the more likely it is for any of their staff to make a mistake. Also, each
custodian has its own IT infrastructure, and connections between different IT systems
can be fickle, posing a further inroad for information to be lost.
Shortfalls are not a hypothetical problem. When Bear Stearns was restructured,
an excess of 28% of shares compared to the shares issued by the company was
discovered. In the discussion paper justifying the Regulation on central securities
depositories the European Commission writes: ‘Fortunately, Bear Stearns was
rescued through a takeover by JP Morgan which bailed out the excess of
securities.’26 In reality this means, of course, that the price JP Morgan was prepared
to pay was distributed between all indirect investors, diluting each of their shares.
The law attempts to reduce the risk of shortfalls by way of regulation. The
regulatory approach to custody differs from the approach to banking. Deposit-
holding customers of banks have contractual claims. The regulatory aim is to ensure
that a bank will, at all times and on short notice, be able to satisfy these claims. The
focus of regulation is on financial stability and capital requirements.27
Clients of custodians have proprietary rights in the assets held for them. In the event of
the custodian’s insolvency, their rights are unaffected by the claims of the custodian’s
creditors. However, these rights only exist if the custodian and all sub-custodians have set
aside assets for clients. If there are no assets, there are no property rights. The regulatory
aim is to ensure that custodians have sufficient assets for proprietary rights to exist.28
The focus is on asset segregation. Following the 2008 financial crises, the
European Union has put significant effort into improving the regulatory regime. The
backbone of the European regime consists of MiFID and the MiFID Implementing
Directive (MiFID ID).29 The European Union recently adopted a new version of
MiFID (MiFID 2).30 On 19 December 2014, ESMA delivered its Technical Advice
26 Commission Staff Working Document: Impact Assessment accompanying the document Proposal for
a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on improving securities settlement in the
European Union and on central securities depositories (CSDs) and amending Directive 98/26/EC, SWD/
2012/0022—COD 2012/0029, para. 8.9 (Annex 9).
27 Staikouras (2014), at pp. 104–106.
28 Ibid., at pp. 105–107.
29 Directive 2006/73/EC, OJ 2006 L 241 of 2 September 2006.
30 Directive (EU) No 65/2014/EU of the European Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial
instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EU and Directive 2011/61/EU (recast), OJ 2014 L 173 of 12
June 2014; Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014




on implementing measures following from the MiFID 2 regime.31 In due course,
this will lead to an updated version of the MiFID Implementing Directive.
In May 2014, the EU adopted a Regulation on central securities depositories.32
There are special as well as recently updated requirements for depositories of
alternative investment funds (AIFs)33 and undertakings for the collective investment
of transferable securities (UCITS).34
It will be shown below that the regulatory regime is unlikely to significantly
reduce the risk of shortfalls and to enhance the efficiency of the current market
infrastructure.
5.2 Outsourcing of Custody
The regulatory regime explicitly permits outsourcing.35 The third party needs to be
subject to regulation and there are requirements as to how outsourcing is to be
identified and monitored.36
Depositories of AIFs and UCITS are permitted to delegate the safekeeping of
assets if they can demonstrate that there is an objective reason for the delegation and
there is no intention of avoiding the regulatory requirements.37 The Regulation
provides no further explanation of what constitutes an objective reason but the fact
that sub-custodians offer an attractive price would very likely qualify as an
objective reason justifying the delegation. There is also no limit on the length a
custody chain can reach.
Even central securities depositories are allowed to outsource. This is subject to
conditions that are designed to preserve the responsibility of the CSD and assist with
regulatory oversight.38 The outsourcing of core services, for example, is subject to
regulatory approval.39 The reason justifying outsourcing by CSDs is to facilitate the
creation of links between CSDs. Links can allow investors to access new markets.
31 ESMA/2014/1569 (ESMA Technical Advice).
32 Regulation (EU) No 909/2014.
33 Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011 on alternative
investment fund managers and amending Directive 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC)
No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 1095/2010 (AIFM Directive), and Commission Delegated Regulation (EU)
No 231/2013 of 19 December 2012 supplementing Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and
of the Council with regard to exemptions, general operating conditions, depositories, leverage,
transparency and supervision (AIFM Regulation).
34 Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the
coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective
investment in transferable securities, last amended by Directive 2014/91/EU of 23 July 2014 (UCITS
Directive).
35 MiFID ID, Art. 17(1).
36 MiFID ID, Art. 17(1)–(3); see also ESMA Technical Advice, supra n. 31, at p. 77, paras. 17 and 18.
37 AIFM Directive, Art. 21(11); Recital 39 of the AIFM Directive stresses that delegation and sub-
delegation ‘should’ be objectively justified; UCITS Directive, Art. 22a(2), and UCITS Directive 2014/91/
EU, Recitals 20 and 23.
38 Central Securities Depositories Regulation, Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 (CSDR), Recital 34 and
Arts. 30–31.
39 Ibid., Recital 28 and Art. 30(4). Core services are listed in CSDR Art. 19(1).
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The flip side of using outsourcing as a method to create such links is, however, that
an additional level is created. This complicates the system even further and makes it
difficult for an efficient infrastructure to emerge.
5.3 Asset Segregation in a Custody Chain
MiFID 2 requires firms that hold financial instruments belonging to clients to make
adequate arrangements so as to safeguard the ownership rights of clients, especially
in the event of the firm’s insolvency, and to prevent the use of a client’s financial
instruments on own account other than with the client’s express consent.40 Client
assets must be identifiable ‘by means of differently titled accounts on the books of
the third party’.41
The requirement for identifiability ‘on the books of the third party’ has received a
wide interpretation on the EU’s official question-and-answer forum. According to
this forum, a custodian would not be in compliance with MiFID rules if its sub-
custodian simply facilitated the segregation of client assets in its own internal
system and held the assets with the next sub-custodian in its own name.42
To comply with client asset rules, a firm must require its sub-custodian to do two things:
1. The sub-custodian must keep three types of internal accounts: one for the
custodian’s clients, one for the custodian’s own proprietary holdings, and one
for its own proprietary holding.
2. In addition, a custodian needs to secure a promise from its sub-custodian to
maintain three types of separate accounts with their external provider: one for
clients of the custodian employing the sub-custodian, one for the custodian’s
own proprietary assets, and one for the sub-custodian’s own proprietary assets.
It would seem that, beyond that, a custodian has no obligation to ensure external
segregation. In particular, it would appear that the custodian does not have an obligation
to require its sub-custodian to keep separate accounts titled with the names of the
custodian’s clients or even beyond that, to cause the sub-custodian of the sub-custodian
to keep separate accounts associated with the names of the clients of the custodian.
Moreover, it would seem possible that client assets are mixed with proprietary
assets of further sub-custodians. Because there is no limit on further delegation and
because the asset separation rules stop after level 3, the rules on separate accounts
can be undermined through the addition of sub-custodians to the chain. This can
provide an incentive for further delegation. If we assume that custodians that do not
need to offer separate accounts or that can use securities in lending arrangements
can offer cheaper rates, it becomes attractive for custodians that have to comply
with stricter rules to delegate custody to them.
40 MiFID 2, Art. 16(8).
41 MiFID ID, Art. 16(1)(d); in order to comply with client separation rules, assets will be held in the
name of a nominee company that holds the securities on trust for the sub-custodian. Hainsworth (2007), at
p. 12; Manifest (2007), at p. 4; see also van Esch (Robeco), supra n. 14.
42 ID 853: Client funds and client property rules (Internal Reference 278), available at http://ec.europa.
eu/finance/koel/index.cfm?fuseaction=domain.show&did=6 (last accessed 9 Sept 2016).
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The rules governing AIFs and UCITS reach further than the MiFID rules. A
depository of such a fund ‘must ensure’ that a third party to whom the depository
has delegated functions does not, in turn, sub-delegate those functions unless the
delegate complies with the same requirements that apply to the depository.43
The AIF/UCITS rules, however, do not specify how a depository is to ‘ensure’
that restrictions continue to operate beyond the level of its immediate sub-custodian.
Presumably, the depository needs to insist on contractual terms reflecting this
requirement in the contract with its immediate sub-custodian. However, beyond
that, there appears to be no requirement for the depository to request being involved
in identifying further sub-custodians or in setting terms at further levels. In addition,
there is no requirement for a sub-custodian to investigate restrictions relating to its
client. This makes it possible for information on restrictions to disappear as the
chain increases in length.
The regime governing AIFs and UCITS is not sufficiently granular to ensure that
investor rights are preserved throughout the chain. The rules on asset segregation do
not adequately contain the risk of shortfalls arising.
5.4 Reconciliations in a Custody Chain
The regulatory regime also tries to contain the risk of shortfalls by requiring
reconciliation of records. According to MiFID ID, firms have to carry out ‘internal
reconciliations of the safe custody assets held for each client with the safe custody
assets held by’ the custodian and its sub-custodian.44 A firm must also conduct
external reconciliations between its internal accounts and those of any third party by
whom those safe custody assets are held.45
The requirement for reconciliations applies to all levels. There is no requirement
for the custodian to verify asset separation beyond the level of its immediate sub-
custodian. This is problematic because a shortfall at any of the levels of the chain
will reduce the assets of the client.
Admittedly, each custodian is subject to its own regulatory regime and this
also includes asset segregation rules. However, intermediaries other than the
custodian immediately connected with the investor operate on incomplete
information. They, their auditors and regulators have no access to the records
at the level above them.
The timing of any particular reconciliation process is not synchronised with the
timing of the reconciliations carried out at other levels. This makes it possible for
shortfalls to remain undetected. The economic loss will fall on the investor. The
lack of synchronised reconciliations that are carried out over the whole length of the
chain can cause investors to suffer significant loss from shortfalls.46 Since it
43 See also AIFM Directive, Art. 21(11), penultimate paragraph, and UCITS Directive 2014/91/EU, Art.
22a(3)(b), last paragraph.
44 MiFID ID, Art. 16(1)(c).
45 Ibid.
46 In the case of Bear Stearns the shortfall was 28%, almost one-third (see supra n. 26).
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operates independently at the level of each custodian, the regulatory requirement for
reconciliations has limited effect and does not significantly reduce the risk of
shortfalls.
5.5 Limitations of Regulation
Overall, the current regulatory regime does not adequately address the inefficiencies
prevailing in custody chains. It has already been mentioned that the European
Commission is investigating if the regulatory regime can be improved.47 One
avenue would be to reform asset segregation rules. The requirement for separate
accounts could be made to operate at all levels, irrespective of how far it stretches.
This could be supported by a requirement for synchronised reconciliations. The
investor’s custodian and its auditor would have to request confirmation that
sufficient numbers of securities are held by all custodians forming the chain. This
would require the investor’s custodian to insist on contractual terms that make it
possible to identify further custodians and request confirmation from them in a way
that allows them to carry out reconciliations. The arrangement would also have to
facilitate verification through auditors. Sub-custodians who are unable to offer such
a facility could not be employed by custodians holding client assets.
The current framework only creates an obligation for the custodian delegating
custody. It does not require a sub-custodian to carry out checks about the
arrangements governing its client. A duty could be imposed on custodians who act
for other custodians to participate in reconciliation processes and to request
confirmation that the assets they hold in the custodian’s own name are not in fact
client assets. This would help ensure that shortfalls are detected in a timely fashion
and make it easier for restrictions to apply at all levels.
However, this does not help investors who want to claim against issuers. We have
already seen that investors could be empowered through mandatory rules enabling
them to pierce through the chain, but this only provides a time-consuming and
costly remedy, burdening cross-border investment with significant disadvantages. It
is next to impossible for the law to make connections effected through custody
chains safe and efficient to use.
6 Target 2 Securities
In its Green Paper the Commission mentions that some believe that the Target 2
Securities (T2S) project will solve the problems associated with the current
infrastructure. The European Central Bank started this project in 2006 to explore the
possibility of creating a pan-European service for securities settlement in the euro
area.48 T2S went live on 22 June 2015 when the first group of central securities
depositories started operations on the platform.
47 See Sect. 3 above.
48 For information about the project, see https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/t2s/html/index.en.html.
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T2S is a computer programme for central securities depositories, central banks,
custodians and other intermediaries to process transfers and record securities
holdings. The focus of the project is on settlement.
It does not allow investors to connect directly with issuers but only serves
custodians connected to a CSD, permitting them to operate according to the same
timetable and use the same ISO 20022 messages format.
T2S offers custodians a common software. The hope is that this will enable them
to move securities more quickly and cheaply between markets, for example, to
deliver collateral not presently needed in one market to another market where it is
needed. T2S is supported by the CSD Regulation, which aims to abolish national
monopolies, thus giving custodians and CSDs the opportunity to operate in all
European markets.49
It is hoped that the combined effect of a common IT platform connecting
custodians across borders and the abolition of national monopolies will facilitate
competition between market participants and, over time, lead to a reduction in the
number of CSDs.
This is unlikely to happen. The UK has had law since 1996 that permits more
than one CSD to operate within its jurisdiction.50 No provider has so far chosen to
compete with the incumbent CSD. Instead, Euroclear took over Crest Ltd in 2002.
Since then, Crest has been operated by a major global custodian who would be able
to actively promote direct holdings also with international clients. Intermediation
levels have, however, been unaffected by this.
Only a limited number of custodians operate across borders in Europe. They may
not be interested in competing with each other. Making it easier for them to
communicate does not provide them with an incentive to compete. It is also unlikely
to significantly reduce the length of custody chains. Without a reason to compete,
the abolition of national monopolies enables the current global custodians to divide
the market between them without reducing the levels of intermediation.
7 Nature of the Problem
The contracts connecting custodians are an expression of arrangements as between
custodians. The contracts enable them to each organise their respective business in a
straightforward way. They benefit from the current structure and its opacity. It enables
them to operate services without having to carry out investigations stretching over multiple
levels, verifying if investors have approved the arrangements concerned. It also means that
the income generated by this activity is unobservable by investors, who, if they were
aware, would be justified to review the level of income and its distribution.
Custodians are unlikely to be interested in change. Existing market participants
have shown themselves to be strongly committed to protecting the status quo. Two
recent examples illustrate this.
49 de Vauplane and Yon (2013), at pp. 200–202. See also Iglesias-Rodriguez (2012).
50 Uncertificated Securities Regulation 1995, reg. 4-6 (1995 SI 3272), now contained in Uncertificated
Securities Regulation 2001, reg. 4–6 (2001 SI 3755).
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When the UK tried to develop an electronic settlement system after the paper
crunch in 1987, the London Stock Exchange and its members tried to develop a
system that would suit all of their respective needs and interests but failed. Reaching
agreement proved impossible. Part of the problem were the vested interests of
existing market participants. The London Stock Exchange and its participants spent
7 years and, at that time, some £400 million trying to set up an electronic settlement
system keeping all participants happy.51 The developers of the new mechanism tried
to achieve the impossible: to create a new system while leaving the role of existing
participants intact. On 11 March 1993, the project was abandoned.52 The Bank of
England took over the reform process and put in place the current settlement system,
CREST, which started to operate on 15 July 1996.
Another example of how intense the pressure from existing market participants
can be is the UNIDROIT Convention on Substantive Rules for Intermediated
Securities (Geneva, 2009). The material available from the UNIDROIT website
demonstrates that the working group aimed to identify and remedy legal uncertainty
and, after substantial pressure from the industry, delivered an instrument that is not
explained by reference to issues of legal certainty and has no impact on existing
market participants.53
The intermediated structure causes the infrastructure that facilitates investment to
be complex at both an operational and a legal level. This complexity is welcome
from the perspective of each individual custodian that is able to limit its contractual
responsibility to its immediate client.54 The problems associated with this
complexity do not affect any of the custodians. They are passed on to investors.
In addition to the risk associated with the issuer, investors are also exposed to the
risk that their assets may be lost in the opaque infrastructure that operates between
them and the issuer and that prevents them from claiming against issuers. This may
explain why the citizens of Europe are reluctant to put their money in cross-border
investments.
8 Creating Competition
Recent technological advances have seen the emergence of digital currencies. The
same technology might be suitable to create a system that directly connects issuers
and investors. For this to happen, however, incentives for competition are required.
These can only come from investors. At present, investors only know that their
terms allow for the delegation of custody. They do not know if and to whom their
assets are outsourced and on what terms. They are also unaware of how long the
chain is. Transparency would help to kick-start competition, leading to a more
efficient system. Custodians should have to disclose to investors the identity and the
terms of all sub-custodians that operate between them and the issuer.
51 The Economist, 13 March 1993, p. 119.
52 The Financial Times, 12 March 1993, p. 19.
53 Micheler (2014a); Micheler (2014b), paras. 5.37–5.40.
54 Micheler (2015), at pp. 526–528.
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Recent technological advances have made cryptocurrencies possible. IT solutions
have been developed that operate without the requirement for a central provider but
still allow investors to have a direct relationship with an asset.55 The European
Union should investigate if the possibilities created by this development could serve
the infrastructure for securities.
The existing network of intermediaries was set up using methods created before
electronic communication became possible. It makes holding securities cross border
expensive and depresses asset values. The problems caused by inserting a custody
chain between issuers and investors do not matter much when cross-border holdings
are sporadic. However, the issue becomes a matter of discussion and possible
reform for the European Union, which has set itself the policy objective of
providing a framework which will facilitate a single European market. It seems that
an appropriate point has been reached for a policy intervention that facilitates the
emergence of an unintermediated settlement and holding mechanism.
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